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Constitutions present themselves as new beginnings, as documents in which a 
political order is invented or reinvented. Of course, no constitutional document 
makes a political world out of nothing, nor can one be written that ignores all 
existing power relations.  But the images that surround constitution writing—
the nation assembled (in a convention or constituent assembly) and, more 
recently voting (in a referendum)—and the language contained in the general 
and the detailed clauses (suggesting that it is the constitution and the sovereign 
people that grant authority and do not rely on existing institutions) both produce 
the image of the constitution as not merely a political effect but also a cause.     
At a minimum, then, constitutions are portrayed as steering politics in new 
directions even if they do not make completely new orders.   Writing a 
constitution has been likened to revolution (Ackerman, 1992); the very word 
suggests that something new is being "constituted."  Even a slightly more modest 
metaphor--"rebuilding the ship at sea"--while it allows that the process is carried 
out with whatever is already on hand, still sees the work as absolutely 
foundational; the post-1989 order was one in which “The question of the 
moment was not ‘What is to be done?’ but ‘Is there anyone who might be able to 
do anything—including defining what needs to be done?’” (Elster et al, 1998, 25)  
The idea that constitutions have deep effects is not merely a conceit of their 
drafters; scholarship on the meaning and impact of different constitutional 
arrangements is voluminous indeed.  But despite high expectations surrounding 
them “constitutional moments” and the fact that the constitutions to which they 
give birth often succeed in provoking deep debate they often fail to inaugurate 
any significant change in important aspects of state-society relations.  
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Remarkably, for all their self-proclaimed status as a new start, the best indication 
of what is in a given constitution is generally what was in the one it is replacing 
(Elkins et al, 2009). 
This is even the case in the critical area of relations between state authorities, 
religious bodies, and religious traditions where attitudes are often polarized. Our 
paper illustrates this claim as it relates to the field of education by examining 
three cases –Norway, the Irish Republic, and Egypt – where, despite the fact that 
the relevant constitutions attempted to mark the achievement of legislative 
independence, the entrenched interests of religious bodies remained largely 
unaffected and have remained so for long periods of time.  The stakes 
surrounding the writing of a constitution can be tremendously high for religious 
institutions; this is, after all, when their relationship to the political order is 
defined. But we find that the documents tend to reflect existing arrangements 
and once written down, they become difficult to change because of the kind of 
deep consensus required for any subsequent change. This is especially so when it 
comes to clauses protecting religious education.  In the push and pull of normal 
politics even those who might wish to redefine religion-state relations in this 
sphere find their efforts better invested elsewhere. Change does nevertheless 
occur, to be sure, but it tends to take place through non-constitutional processes. 
Textual settlements show impressive staying power because redrawing them is 
costly, contentious, and, ultimately, often unnecessary. When change to clauses 
providing for religious education takes place, it is often indeed after the fact with 
real institutional change typically preceding constitutional change. 
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The Surprisingly Widespread Constitutionalization of Religion 
Almost all constitutions of the world (approximately 200 of them) make some 
reference to religion. On one count “there is only one constitution [in the world] 
for which religion is an irrelevant phenomenon: the [1993] Czech Constitution.” 
(Iban 2013: 40)1 Yet how do constitutions generally deal with religion? Many 
mentions are brief and formulaic, for example recognizing a constitutional right 
to religious freedom. In the United States constitution, the only initial reference 
was to bar the application of religious tests for public office. Even when 
amended, the text simply barred Congress from establishing a national religion, a 
formulation that left even existing establishment at the state level intact for a 
considerable period.  Perhaps it is this early history that explains why much 
mainstream constitutional analysis has betrayed a strong secularist bias which 
does not do justice to the place of religion in constitutional systems. This is not 
surprising given that the USA can be said to have “invented” the modern secular 
state with its late 18th century constitution (Madeley 2009). Yet that specific path 
is much more the exception than the rule: most constitutions in the world have 
chosen a very different set of directions.  
Reading constitutional texts and considering the political circumstances that 
brought them into being, it is the coexistence of religion and the state, and the 
openly accommodative (or collaborative) terms of the relationship between 
them, that are most striking.  Far from a secular aversion to mentioning religion, 
most texts seem to approach the subject of religion by assuming that the 
document’s role is to define the relationship between religion and state in a 
                                                        
1
 Neither the word religion nor any other related term appears in the Constitution of the Czech 
Republic, although according to the article 112 of the constitution it forms part of “the 
constitutional system.” (See Madeley 2015a) 
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manner that accommodates the former.  This accommodative type of 
constitutionalism has been obscured in much mainstream scholarship, especially 
that in the United States, for three reasons. First, constitutions are typically 
issued in the name of a sovereign, and most follow the US model of issuing them 
in the name of a sovereign people. But this fictitious category is very often a 
deeply religious people, and religious actors and institutions have a large 
investment in the attempt to draw a line in a document between the secular and 
religious spheres. It is not surprising therefore that constitutional orders should 
often be entangled in issues of religion, however much their authors might have 
sought to avoid that.  
A second reason why this constitutional approach has been neglected is the 
intellectual influence of France and the United States. The French approach 
might generally be termed one of aggressive secularism by contrast with US 
separationism which took the ostensibly more religion-friendly form of the “twin 
tolerations” (Stepan, 2000). Seen from a global perspective, however, both cases 
are outliers. The French model has few followers and US political practice has 
been – at least with the decline of strict separationism from the 1980s - fairly 
friendly to religion in the public sphere (although campaigns in recent decades 
have continued to criticize the inherited arrangements in the fields of education 
and social welfare as inherently secularist and hostile to religion).  
A third reason is that the focus of constitutional scholars has been mainly on 
either the structures of governance (such as judicial review) or on rights, (with 
religion considered a question primarily of freedom of religion). A fuller reading 
of constitutions, however, reveals many more direct and indirect references to 
religion—especially in preambles, occasional ideological provisions, 
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establishment clauses, and, not least, in clauses related to society, parental 
choice and education.  
But if constitutions routinely try to accommodate religion, how do they do so? 
Preambular mentions give few indications of how politics is supposed to operate 
in practice.  A more applied way of understanding the accommodative 
relationship between religion and the state in constitutions is to focus on the 
field of education. This article compares the modern experiences of Norway, 
Ireland and Egypt, where the principle of separation has existed neither in 
practice nor law, and where mutually accommodative relationships between 
religion and the state have survived for long periods of time. 
Norway is a majority Protestant society, the Irish Republic is overwhelmingly 
Catholic, and Egypt is predominantly Muslim. Although their constitutional 
orders reflect these historic confessional linkages, the constitutional treatment of 
religion does not differ greatly between them. Each has strikingly different 
religious structures for determining and teaching religious truths, but the 
constitutional protection of religious education has been robust for long periods 
of time. In all three, constitutions have been written or amended to reflect 
changing social and political conditions. In Norway and Ireland, the 
constitutional text has been very slow to change; only in Egypt have there been 
greater changes to the formal text. What is common to all three cases however is 
that the clauses protecting religious education seem relatively immune to change 
and the changes that do occur tend to follow rather than produce changes in the 
actual structure and role of religious education. In Norway and Ireland 
secularization has led to a general redefinition of the relationships between 
Church and State; yet religious education stood out as the one area where 
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constitutional change, if it came at all, was slow to emerge. Thus there may be 
something about religion -specifically about religious education -  that explains 
the way arrangements, once laid down, tend to remain difficult to change; in 
constitutional terms this steadiness makes them very immune to the breaks and 
transformation which otherwise characterize constitutional moments. 
All three examples might be characterized as old societies with new states—or at 
least with states that newly established juridical sovereignty to a degree. They 
gained a formal independence in the first decades of the twentieth century and 
passed through a period of vigorous assertion of national identity.  But in all 
three cases, the first constitution came before full juridical sovereignty was 
clearly established. The initial documents were drafted and adopted during 
episodes of international and domestic contention on a variety of issues. 
Religious structures and authorities—and populations in which national identity 
was connected with religion—were very much part of the political equation. 
Some sought to codify their role by constitutionalizing it, especially in the 
educational realm. If there was opposition to this role, it was at best obliquely 
expressed, meaning that the constitutions tended to accommodate existing 
religious arrangements in the educational realm.  
 The resulting constitutional approaches to religion are hardly unusual—they are 
far closer to international norms than those of France and the US. Although the 
place of religion in education has continued to excite vigorous debate up to the 
present time the mutually accommodative approach was remarkably resilient in 
all three cases. While there are obvious differences, the general patterns they 
jointly display on religion and education cannot be explained by particular sets 
of religious beliefs, institutions, or history and culture, since the patterns hold 
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even when these vary. They are better seen not as the product of Protestantism, 
Catholicism, or Islam but instead of a particular political configuration in which 
constitutional architects were willing (and many even insistent upon the need) 
to accommodate a religious element in constitutional provisions for education. 
While there has been great change – in the content of religious education, the 
curricula, institutional mechanisms, and indeed in national identities – the 
enthusiasm (or at least willingness) for accommodating the religious perspective 
in the constitution proved far more enduring. 
Constitutions in this regard represent continuing social, political and religious 
outcomes more than producing such outcomes. Indeed, the texts, even though 
they are the product of major moments of change (such as independence), seem 
not to determine subsequent practice—they seem more often to mirror practice 
existing at the time prior to the drafting of the constitution. And that pattern 
continues after promulgation. The compromises and formulas drafted early on 
prove difficult to dislodge. The reason is not that there is no change; just the 
opposite. The three constitutional orders we focus on have undergone real 
changes in religion-state relations since their first constitutions were issued. And 
the educational systems have been the site of these changes. But while 
constitutional language is often strong on religious education, it is still somewhat 
general, admitting of a variety of institutional arrangements to implement it. As a 
result, substantial social change, often gradual in nature, could be incorporated 
without requiring textual amendment. Constitutional language in some cases 
could come to seem anachronistic, a product of an earlier era when prevailing 
religious sentiments were very different as was the array of political and 
religious forces. Textual formulas were generally capacious enough to allow for 
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such change and political forces that wish to reconsider founding formulas rarely 
find amendment—essentially a full frontal assault on entrenched positions that 
are sometimes eroding on their own—the most appropriate tactic. 
Only in Egypt have constitutional formulas shown more continuous change; 
significantly it has generally been authoritarian regimes that have redrafted the 
governing documents and therefore done so with a bit of a freer hand (with 
religious forces ones that need to be considered but rarely in a position to 
mobilize large publics). But even in Egypt, textual changes have followed rather 
than produced actual changes on the ground of religion-state relations in the 
educational sector; those relations have shown just as much continuity and slow 
change as in Norway and Ireland. 
Those who are familiar with the U.S. doctrine of separationism, or are 
accustomed to thinking of constitutional life in terms of antinomies (such as 
Church and State) would expect the field of religious education to be prime 
candidates for the eruption of constitutional conflicts. Members of religious 
communities often see education as critical to maintaining and reproducing their 
hold over the faithful; and in many, if not most, societies, religion is closely tied 
to issues of nationalism and identity. Challenges to these underlying assumptions 
might logically be expected to give rise to battles over constitutional texts. Yet in 
these cases, such challenges have emerged only rarely. Not only do the clauses 
change slowly, they have been less an arena for conflict than might be expected 
when other aspects of state-religion relations became contentious. Hence the 
constitutional protection of religious education has been remarkably immune 
both to legal transformation and to changes in the wider social environment. The 
narratives that follow show how this has been true for the three cases.  
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The case of Protestant Norway 
Norway’s experience with written constitutions began even before it became an 
independent state. That experience is continuous in two senses: the original 
constitution continues in force, and substantial textual changes have been very 
limited. The original constitutional provision for religious education was brief 
but very strong, and it was honored faithfully for decades. When social and 
political changes inside the country in the late nineteenth century and pressures 
from outside the country in the second half of the twentieth made themselves 
felt, the constitution was eventually amended. In 1814 the Eidsvoll constitution 
had simply codified longstanding arrangements that still existed in the field of 
religion when it was written; as those arrangements came under pressure and 
changed, the forces pressing for reform tended to shy away from constitutional 
amendment until their purposes had been secured through other means. At the 
time Norway’s constitutional order was born it continued to bear the marks of 
the confessional state. And it continued to repudiate secularism (at least, as 
understood in terms of church disestablishment) on paper until secular political 
trends had deeply changed the nature of Norwegian society. 
The 1814 constitution – the oldest written constitution in Europe still in force – 
came into existence during an attempt to establish the country’s national 
independence from Denmark. While the constitution itself endured, the broader 
attempt at independence failed, and the country instead entered a union with 
Sweden, which was to last until 1905. The 1814 constitution was partly inspired 
by the American 1776 Declaration of Independence, the French Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789 and the subsequent U.S. and French 
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constitutions. As such it was remarkably liberal, coming as it did before the 
reactionary backlash, which followed the final conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars 
in 1815. One important deviation from the American and French models was the 
retention of the institution of monarchy, although the king’s power was to be 
markedly restricted.  And in one other critical respect the constitution was 
curiously conservative—religion. There was a complete failure to decide 
whether or how to reform the restrictive, positively oppressive, regime of 
religious laws and regulations inherited from the Danish absolute monarchy. 
Indeed, the constitution’s language on the subject simply reflected existing 
realities.  
The Evangelical-Lutheran religion was to remain the state religion, and the use of 
“remain” in paragraph 2 was later taken to require that the confessional and 
legal standards applying in the field of religious regulation in 1814 should 
continue to apply. In the absence of a constitutional guarantee of religious 
freedom this meant that all the restrictive and coercive regulations inherited 
from the Danish era were to continue in force. These included the use of 
penalties attaching to those who failed to bring up their children in the Lutheran 
faith by having them baptized and then ensuring their attendance at 
confirmation instruction: those who refused or neglected to have their children 
baptized, instructed and confirmed were subject to potentially heavy fines.2 
Although the application of coercive rules varied in practice, in Weber’s terms 
the Norwegian church remained a compulsory institution and induction into this 
                                                        
2
 As for the children or young persons who had for whatever reason failed to receive 
confirmation, they were prevented from marrying (this could of course only be undertaken in 
church) but also, from inheriting land, witnessing in court or enjoying other rights of citizenship. 
In fact, anyone who remained unconfirmed at the age of 19 could on discovery be put in the 
stocks or sent to prison.2 (Thorkildsen 2014: 60).  
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institution was dependent on passing a religious test after a period of 
instruction. Unsurprisingly therefore, such primary education as was provided 
revolved around preparation for confirmation and first communion, as if this 
ecclesiastical rite de passage were a form of final matriculation and passage into 
adulthood.  
The tradition of Lutheran religious education in Norway was not a product of the 
constitution: it dated back to the Reformation of the 1530s. Initially, the basic 
text was Luther’s Small Catechism, and the local priest and his lay assistant were 
charged with the responsibility of taking children through it. In the 1730s during 
a period of religious enthusiasm, an attempt was made to improve such 
education as the clergy provided by giving it a more secure institutional form: a 
law of 1739 on confirmation required that candidates must attend formal classes 
in a school in each parish. It was intended that all Norwegian children should be 
able to read the Small Catechism and the Bible for themselves instead of relying 
on oral rote learning.  
Around 1850 there was a relaxation of the more extreme rigors of the old 
church-state regime with the repeal in 1842 of the Conventicle Ordinance (which 
had made illegal the holding of public religious meetings without the approval of 
the relevant local minister), the 1845 Dissenter Law (which for the first time 
permitted exit from the church so long as it was in order to join a recognized 
Protestant denomination) and the 1851 constitutional amendment removing the 
ban on Jews entering the country. Yet these changes did not amount to the 
dismantlement of the old church regime and when in 1860 a law was passed to 
make the building of separate school buildings in each rural parish the norm, the 
local parish priest or minister were deputed to chair each local board of 
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education. The biggest change occurred however in the 1880s as part of a key 
constitutional episode known as Norway’s “breakthrough to parliamentarism”. 
So far as education was concerned, the Conservatives had been in favor of 
continuing the practice of church and government officials, under the leadership 
of the Department of the Church and Education, controlling the form and content 
of school instruction. The Liberals, on the other hand, favored spiritual freedom 
and democracy in the school as well as in politics and therefore argued for a 
wide-ranging set of reforms: school boards should be elected by the people; 
dissenters should also be allowed to teach (though not in the religious education 
classes) and be members of school boards; church ministers should no longer be 
the automatic chairmen of the boards; and any involvement of the higher clergy 
should be restricted to overseeing the field of Christian education. (Haraldsø 
1989: 189) And in 1889 the Liberal model largely won out.  
While the 1889 reforms and the associated broadening of the curriculum 
reduced the religious element in education, the school continued to be officially 
dedicated to “contributing toward the Christian upbringing of children” and the 
system of clerical supervision of religion classes remained in place. This 
continued to be the case even after the Norwegian Labor Party came to power in 
1935. Even though the party had earlier been in favor of the disestablishment of 
the state church, in the new school law of 1936 the school’s confessional linkage 
was maintained, although the number of hours dedicated to religious knowledge 
education was reduced. A series of rearguard campaigns were mounted aimed at 
resisting secularizing trends, fighting in particular against the reduction in the 
number of hours of religious instruction and contesting proposals that religious 
knowledge education should effectively be transformed into courses about 
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religion, instead of being effectively Lutheran confirmation classes. And with the 
introduction in the year of the 150th anniversary of the 1814 constitution of an 
amendment finally establishing a positive right to religious freedom, religious 
education continued to be a source of contention. 
In 1969 Norway did finally abandon its historic commitment to the idea that 
religious education in the public schools could legitimately provide instruction in 
religion rather than education about religion and a parallel model was 
introduced by which pupils (or their parents) could chose between courses on 
Knowledge of Christianity (Kristendomskunnskap) or Ethics. (Andreassen 2013: 
138) The object clause of the 1969 Education Act still however read that public 
schools should “with the understanding of and cooperation with the home, assist 
in providing pupils with a Christian and ethical upbringing.” (ibid. 140) By the 
1990s growing cultural and religious diversity, much of it associated with 
immigration, led to an increasing concern with the rights of religious minorities 
and in 1995 an expert report called for a much broader religious studies 
curriculum. Two years later a new compulsory school subject called Christianity, 
Religion and Ethics was launched, with the intention of promoting knowledge, 
tolerance and understanding between the holders of different religious and 
other worldviews. The course was to be mandatory on the grounds that allowing 
exemption would defeat the objective of promoting mutual understanding 
among pupils of different faith backgrounds.3  
The new arrangements failed to achieve consensus however; they led instead to 
a prolonged episode of contestation, involving the highest legal bodies both in 
                                                        
3
 Exemption was to be allowed only from certain parts of the subject—for example, those that could be 
taken to involve religious practices. (Plesner 2013: 264) 
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Norway and internationally. Feeling that their rights to freedom of belief were 
being jeopardized, a number of groups representing adherents of minority 
religions and humanists, joined together in a “Campaign for Freedom of Belief in 
Norwegian Schools.” (Eidsvåg et. al. 2004: 786).  In 2001 a number of minor 
changes were made in response to the campaign, including renaming the course, 
but the right of exemption was not significantly expanded. In August 2001 
Norway’s Supreme Court unanimously found against the campaigners, only 
conceding that if the actual implementation of the arrangements for the new 
course failed to respect their human rights a further lawsuit could be brought.  
In 2004 however the UN Human Rights Committee concluded that Norway was 
in breach of Article 18 of the Human Rights Code on grounds of the “considerable 
burden” placed on parents wishing to exempt their children. (Andreassen 142) A 
year later the curriculum and rules for exemption were revised in order to meet 
this objection, although a right to full exemption was not introduced. The Folgerø 
group of humanist parents then took their case to Strasbourg and in 2007 the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found by a narrow 
majority of 9 to 8 in favor of the claim that the course could not be deemed 
sufficiently “objective, critical and pluralistic.”4 The government reacted quickly 
and from 1 August 2008, a new course “Religion, Life Stances and Ethics” was 
launched. Since then the controversy has waned although the small Christian 
Democratic Party continues to argue for a change in the name and content of the 
course to reflect the special position of Christianity in Norway. In comparative 
                                                        
4 The majority of the Grand Chamber found that the amount of time spent on Christianity was 
acceptable, since 86 per cent of Norway”s population are members of its established church but took 
the view that the curriculum favoured Christianity qualitatively over other religions, and that since this 
was neither neutral nor objective parents should be provided with the possibility of exemption. See 
Folgerø et al v. Norway, 2007. See also Leigh 2012. 
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terms what is most striking however is the resilience of the Norwegian 
educational policy of continuing to teach about religion – and in particular 
Christianity – in the public school at a time of widespread reform in church-state 
relations which has amounted to virtual disestablishment following a swathe of 
constitutional amendments which entered into force in 2012.5 
 
The case of Catholic Ireland 
In Ireland, as in Norway, constitution writing tended to concretize existing 
arrangements rather than seek to mold them. Ireland’s independent 
constitutional history is however shorter and less continuous—the initial 
constitution of 1922 was replaced in 1937. But in neither document was there 
much of an effort to change the fundamentals of the educational system. Instead, 
constitutional language was crafted that supported existing arrangements. As 
Irish society has changed, particularly in recent decades, those arrangements 
have come under some pressure, though they remain surprisingly robust. The 
constitutional provisions have meantime remained untouched—and remarkably, 
even the changes that have been advocated and instituted have left the language 
crafted decades ago unchallenged. 
Two principles enunciated by canon law are (1) that Catholic parents should 
send their children to schools that provide a Catholic education; and (2) that the 
State should provide the parents with the freedom to make such a choice. Both 
were expressed in the 1937 constitution, which continued to provide 
constitutional protection for “a system of public funding of private schools” 
                                                        
5
 On the constitutional changes introducing this reform of church-state relations from 2012 see 
Madeley 2015b. 
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(Clarke 1995: 66). The constitution recognized the family as “the natural and 
fundamental unit of Society” and also states that the State must “respect the 
inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their means, for the 
religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children.” 
These clauses have never been amended. 
The system implicitly recognized by the constitution was forged under the Union 
of Britain and Ireland (1800-1921) when a close identification between the Irish 
nation and the Catholic religion developed. The British Government had 
abandoned attempts at creating a unified public education system: a policy 
which, initiated first in 1831, was resisted not only on religious grounds, but on 
the basis that it would be a tool of colonial assimilation (Daly 2010, 205-06). 
After independence in 1921, the 1922 constitution had made primary education 
a constitutional right, but most schools, primary and secondary, remained owned 
and staffed by the Catholic Church. The only outstanding question in 1937 was 
how to secure the status quo by constitutional provisions (Clarke 1998, 66). The 
value of religious education was unquestioned: both Church and State 
propagated the view that a separate Irish identity had survived centuries of 
British rule because the people remained loyal to their Catholic faith. Neither did 
Irish nationalists believe that economic development required a reduced role for 
either the Catholic or Protestant Churches in education.  
Since the 1960s nation-building has given way to an acceptance of the need for 
modernization, which in education began with the provision of universal free 
secondary education (up to Intermediate Cert), for the first time in 1967. Gellner 
(1987; 6-28), citing Durkheim, noted that nationalism can combine two sources 
of social solidarity; one stemming from the possession of a common culture, the 
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other, increasingly, coming from the opportunities and rights membership of an 
industrial society brings. The second has forced many states to intervene in 
education in order to have a work force that meets the demands of industry. 
Ireland has also seen the expansion, first of secondary, and then of university 
education. This huge expansion has upset the moral and intellectual dominance 
of Catholicism but the relationship between Church and State in this field 
remains accommodative. Legal changes, such as the liberalization of the divorce 
law, have followed, but with respect to education this has been layered change: 
new educational curricula, policies and institutions have been placed on top of 
the old. 
The first half of article 42 reads: 
1.The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the child is the 
Family and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to 
provide, according to their means, for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical 
and social education of their children. 
2. Parents shall be free to provide this education in their homes or in private 
schools or in schools recognised or established by the State.  
3. 1°. The State shall not oblige parents in violation of their conscience and lawful 
preference to send their children to schools established by the State, or to any 
particular type of school designated by the State. 
Bunreacht na hÉireann: Constitution of Ireland (Dublin: Stationers Office, 2012). 
The courts have generally assumed clarity of intent on the part of the drafters in 
the drafting of such clauses. In 1998, when the secular pressure group The 
Campaign to Separate Church and State challenged the constitutionality of the 
State funding of school chaplains, the judges ruled that article 42 obliged the 
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state to actively assist parents, through the educational system, with the 
religious and moral formation of their children (Hogan and Whyte 2006, 1942). 
Since discrimination on denominational grounds in the provision of State 
assistance for schools is also prohibited - as is the State endowment of religion - 
the ideological roots of article 42 may lie in nineteenth century liberalism 
(Hogan 2006, 1941-2). Yet there was a near-monopoly situation: as late as 1992-
93 93.1% of primary schools were Roman Catholic and just under three quarters 
of second-level students attended denominational schools.  
Nonetheless, Protestant schools have the same rights and autonomy as Catholic 
schools. The roots of the system lie in a period when the island was united under 
British rule and when co-existence was a huge challenge for the state, as it is 
today in Northern Ireland. Ireland still has a double-minority problem (Catholics 
in Northern Ireland, Protestants in the Republic). Any attempt to undermine 
denominational education in the Republic will weaken the rights of Protestant 
and other minorities, and send a negative message across the border. In this 
context it is perhaps unsurprising that Catholic and Protestant defenders of 
denominational schooling both now couch its virtues in the language of choice, 
pluralism and diversity, and the rights of all religions, rather than affirming the 
value of a religious education per se (Daly 2010, 252). Since the 1990s, the rate of 
growth of gaelscoileanna (private Irish language schools) and of multi-
denominational schools has outpaced those of Catholic or Protestant schools. 
The State provides full funding for all types of school, including these. Yet the 
Catholic Church continues to resist the pressure for it to divest control of schools 
to other bodies, even though the sharp decline in religious vocations means that 
it cannot actually staff its schools or teach pupils directly. Under the 1998 
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Education Act responsibility for the protection of their ethos is “essentially 
devolved to a plurality of private “patron bodies”, which are predominantly 
denominational in character and often appointed by Catholic or Protestant 
bishops (ibid, 202). The former Minister for Education Ruairi Quinn commented 
“we are the only country in Europe… where the primary school system is 
controlled by private organizations…. We are paying for them and funding 
them… We need to take these schools and our entire primary school 
infrastructure into public management” (quoted in ibid: 253). 
 
In explaining the persistence of such an old system it is not enough to cite the 
strength of judicial review. Legal challenges to article 42 have actually been rare. 
Because of their conservative ideological basis both articles 41 (on the family) 
and 42, “are arguably under more strain than many other provisions of the 
constitution, given the increasing secularization of Irish society beginning in the 
1960s” (Hogan 2006, 1829). Yet due to their stress on the married family, and 
their paternalist attitude towards women, this has been more true for the 
provisions on the family which in May 2015 was subject to a referendum 
allowing for same-sex marriage. Indeed, while there have been referendums on 
abortion, citizenship, divorce, the special status of the Catholic Church, same-sex 
marriage and Northern Ireland there has been no referendum on religious 
education. Reforming deeply embedded bureaucratic structures is not as easy as 
asking yes or no questions about abortion or divorce in referendums. The Irish 
constitution can only be changed by this means, and the referendum has 
frequently worked as “a conservative device.” When in the early 1970s the 
Department of Education received legal advice concerning whether Church-run 
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schools’ development of an integrated curriculum – in which religious and 
secular subjects were considered one – was constitutional, the Catholic 
authorities indicated that they would seek a referendum on the issue since they 
thought it essential to the concept of “a Catholic school” (Daly 2010: 214). None 
of the various reviews of the constitution (including that of a Constitutional 
Convention the majority of which consisted of randomly selected citizens and 
which met between 2013-2014), proposed changing article 42. The article 
remains invariant in the face of the turnover in governments, resilient in the face 
of legal challenges, and insulated from changes in public opinion. 
Religious education has been central to primary education in Ireland since the 
early nineteenth century: independence has changed little in this respect. Until 
the 1960s its basic role included the strengthening of national identity and the 
moral formation of the person; there were few differences between Church and 
State in that regard. Since then secondary and university education have 
expanded and most school leavers now go on to “third level” education. This 
expansion has not necessitated constitutional change, one simple reason being 
that the drafters could not have foreseen it. At root, the basic idea that a child 
should receive instruction in a religion during its formative experiences is what 
has persisted. If religious education is ever to come under real pressure from the 
state, producing more schools that are genuinely owned and managed by the 
state, or a dominant state sector, one suspects that the protection of parental 
choice and denominationalism in the constitution will be the last front in the 
attack. The subject is too sensitive, the principles of article 42 (which are also 
found in European and international Conventions on Human Rights), are 
universal, and given the existence of broad support for moral and religious 
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education (also found in Egypt), politicians have no incentive to act. Hence we 
can expect Ireland to duplicate Norway’s glacial experience of constitutional 
change.  
 
The case of Muslim Egypt 
Egypt’s history of constitutional provisions linking religion and education is 
unlike Ireland and Norway in two relevant respects. First, its constitutional 
history is more discontinuous, with new documents being written on numerous 
occasions. Second, constitutional provisions on religious education have been the 
object of tinkering in each iteration. Yet for all the superficial change, Egyptian 
constitutional history, like Norwegian and Irish, shares the insistence on 
accommodating religious education in very strong terms but doing so in a 
manner that tends to reflect existing arrangements. And, like the other cases, 
when change in those arrangements come, the constitutional text is the last place 
that betrays any evidence. 
In Egypt, education has been a central part of a state-building project now over 
two centuries old (Heyworth Dunne 1939). That project has been centralizing 
and ambitious but it has also been shaped by two features that have persisted 
despite significant changes in constitutional arrangements. First, education has 
always been built on a close relationship between religion and state; it 
constitutes a feature that predated the ambitious state-building project but 
deeply embedded itself within that project. Second, the construction of a 
nationwide educational system was closely related to battles over state 
sovereignty, national uniformity and centralization—in which Egypt’s rulers 
attempted to assert central control but were compelled to accept a degree of 
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autonomy for important segments of the educational system, especially those 
which catered for minorities and cosmopolitan elites.  
Egyptian constitutional texts would have seemed the obvious place to sort out 
and entrench the authority of the state, the role for religious institutions, and 
their mutual relationship with the educational system. Yet the provisions that 
were included are fairly skeletal and have rarely proved to be the subject of 
much political or legal controversy – only in the last few decades has the matter 
been hotly debated, and then with surprisingly limited effect on the textual 
outcome. Reading Egypt’s constitutions over time, it is possible to detect a 
degree of “mission creep” regarding the degree to which educational and 
religious provisions began to meld together in an accommodative relationship. 
And there seems to be a consistent understanding that the state’s duties are to 
foster and protect morality and religion in public life, fostering a generally 
unstated elision between education and faith. But despite this being a society 
with an official religion, the fundamental political text says very little about the 
meaning of that designation. The underlying continuity of institutional 
arrangements—ones which have only changed glacially and outside of the 
constitutional process—is perhaps the best explanation for the constitutional 
vagueness. 
In the nineteenth century, Egypt was an autonomous province within the 
Ottoman Empire; the country was occupied by Great Britain in 1882 and 
unilaterally declared its independence in 1922. Egypt’s first full constitution 
came in 1923, after the country’s formal (if incomplete) independence. It has had 
a series of documents since then—a new constitution in 1956, a series of interim 
documents in the 1960s, a new “permanent” constitution in 1971 (amended 
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significantly on religious issues in 1980 and 2007), another new constitution in 
2012, and a thoroughly revised document in 2014. The country’s constitutional 
history is a series of discontinuous steps; its educational history on the other 
hand is one of recurring themes and underlying continuities. 
Egypt’s constitutions generally built on a foundation of European documents and 
the Ottoman constitution of 1876 (which did not govern Egypt, but still 
influenced political thinking). Article 16 of the Ottoman constitution proclaimed: 
“All schools are under state supervision. Proper means will be devised for 
harmonizing and regulating the instruction given to all the Ottomans, but 
without interfering with the religious education in the various districts.”  
Egyptian rulers harbored ambitions similar to those of their Ottoman 
counterparts—they sought to build an educational system that was under their 
control and that served the economic, bureaucratic, and military needs of the 
state. But they did so in a context in which religious institutions still retained 
considerable autonomy. When the nineteenth century began, most education in 
the country was religious in nature and mosques or schools associated with 
them were the primary location for teaching. (The country’s premier educational 
institution, al-Azhar, grew out of a mosque founded in 969.) In order to build 
educational systems that served their needs, Egypt’s ambitious rulers of the 
nineteenth century preferred to build structures outside of the al-Azhar 
establishment. And citizens of European powers enjoyed extraterritorial status, 
leaving the Egyptian state powerless to govern the education of what emerged to 
be an economically and politically powerful set of residents—including 
ambitious Egyptian elite families that sought to send their children to European 
schools for the education, access, and prestige they provided. Such schools were 
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important thus important for several reasons: their ability to serve as links with 
foreign educational systems whose curriculum some followed; their legal and 
political autonomy from the Egyptian state; the manner in which they offered 
protected places for minority communities; and their attractiveness to members 
of various cultural, economic and political elites who often sent their children to 
such schools because of their perceived superior quality.  
During British occupation (1882 to 1922), education was one of the most 
frequent flashpoints between the British (who maintained the form of Ottoman 
sovereignty and allowed a measure of Egyptian participation in governance and 
administration) and the Egyptian political elite: the former saw education as a 
fiscal burden and a luxury in an agricultural society while the latter saw 
education as a means for development and self-government. The result was very 
slow change if any at all, with the British lacking the political nerve to confront 
the religious establishment and the Egyptian political elite lacking the resources 
or the authority to build the system they wished. 
Egyptian independence offered the possibility of major change and the newly 
independent leadership of the state saw an opportunity to construct a far more 
extensive educational system under its control. The constitution of 1923 
provided for the freedom of education “provided it does not violate public order 
or contradicts morals. Public education shall be regulated by law. Primary 
education shall be compulsory for Egyptian boys and girls, and shall be free in 
public schools” (Article 19). It also made reference to religious institutions (most 
probably an intended reference to mosques and especially al-Azhar), but 
deferred the matters to legislation and the royal will: “The law shall regulate the 
means whereby the King exercises his power as per the principles stated herein 
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on religious institutes, appointing religious leaders, endowments administered 
by the Ministry of Religious Endowments, and on general matters of religions 
allowed in the country. Should there be no legislative provisions, the exercise of 
such power shall continue as per the rules and traditions currently in force. “ 
Thus, the independent Egyptian state worked to build primary, secondary, and 
post-secondary systems that spread the length of the country and presented 
itself to the citizenry as the primary provider of education at all levels. But it still 
confronted realities which limited those ambitions. The political leadership 
made no direct attempt to diminish the autonomy of religious institutions and 
fold them more clearly into the state structure. It did gradually extend the state 
educational system, but fiscal limitations mandated slow expansion. Just as 
significantly, foreigners retained extraterritorial status until mid-century, and 
Britain claimed the right to protect foreigners until it negotiated a 
comprehensive treaty with the Egyptian government in 1936. The result was 
that dreams of centralization, uniformity, expansion, and state control were 
greatly tempered by political realities. 
These realities sparked resentment. Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood was 
founded in part out of suspicion of the influence of missionaries, Western-
operated orphanages, and Christian schools (Baron 2014). And the state 
educational system itself became a space for potential political opposition to 
work. Beginning in the 1920s, various movements (initially nationalist ones but 
then the Muslim Brotherhood and others) recruited among teachers and 
students. University campuses were sites of nationalist agitation in the 1940s. 
Only in the 1950s did a new regime come into power that was determined to 
implement more fully the centralizing and ambitious vision that had been 
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motivating generations of rulers. The program was clear: universal education for 
all citizens, control over religion (of an étatist but not secular variety—i.e. 
predicated on state regulation of religion with no wall of separation between 
religion and state), and elimination of the pockets of privilege and autonomy. 
Unsurprisingly, the 1956 constitution increased the level of state control over 
education and also explicitly mentioned its duty to provide for “moral education” 
(Article 49). 
And the state asserted control even over religious institutions including 
schools—whether Christian, foreign, or fully Egyptian and Muslim in nature. As 
foreign-owned assets were nationalized and Egypt embarked on an autarchic 
development, foreigners lost all protected status. Their schools tended to limp 
along, tolerated but brought under closer bureaucratic oversight. Al-Azhar 
retained considerable autonomy until 1961 when the state asserted far more 
direct control while also building a full university with a range of disciplines and 
professional schools alongside the religious faculties. Yet, while al-Azhar may 
have lost autonomy it was allowed not only the lion’s share of post-secondary 
religious education; it was also given oversight of an entirely separate set of 
primary and secondary schools (with a greater religious content in their 
curriculum). The result was that Egypt’s patchwork system survived the regime’s 
centralizing tendencies. To this day, the apparent existence of a clear, well-
ordered, logical, and hierarchal system is complicated (or perhaps enriched) by 
this network of other schools—an Egyptian secondary school graduate might sit 
for the thanawiyya ‘amma [general secondary school] examination or take the 
thanawiyya‘ ‘amma azhariyya for Azhar students, with significant students from 
ambitious or elite backgrounds targeting instead the GSCE, an International 
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Baccalaureate, or a host of European credentials. Controversy over the role of 
international influence continues up  the present (Sayed, 2006) but rarely takes 
constitutional form. 
Indeed, it was not until 1971 that the topic of the diversity of educational 
institutions was addressed directly. Articles 18 and 19 of the 1971 constitution 
read: “Education is a right guaranteed by the State. It is obligatory in the primary 
stage and the State shall work to extend obligation to other stages. The State 
shall supervise all branches of education and shall guarantee the independence 
of universities and scientific research centers, with a view to linking all this with 
society and production requirements. Religious education shall be a principal 
topic of general education curricula.” Yet the 1971 constitution, which finally 
codified this dedication to state oversight, was followed by a move in the 
opposite direction. An economic opening led to a greater willingness to tolerate 
foreign educational activities as expatriate communities returned, the Egyptian 
political and economic elite regained some cosmopolitan ambitions, and the 
severe authoritarianism of the 1960s gradually receded. A revival of religious 
sentiment led to the al-Azhar system allowing strongly religious parts of the 
public to form pockets of pious communities under the protection of the 
University—and under the generally tolerant but still watchful eyes of the 
security authorities.   And alongside the al-Azhar religious system, a network of 
private schools also expanded, observing the required curriculum but also 
following their own practices and pedagogical techniques that imparted their 
distinctive messages.  (Herrera 2000).  The overall result was a far less coherent 
system than may have appeared simply from a top-down view (Starrett, 1998). 
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The 1971 constitution remained in force until 2011 when a popular uprising led 
the military to suspend it. An elected parliament, dominated by Islamists, 
designated a one-hundred-member committee to draft a new document, which 
was approved by a popular referendum in December 2012. It might be expected 
that Islamists would have devoted considerable attention to religious education, 
especially given that the Muslim Brotherhood and salafists (who dominated the 
drafting), stressed education within their own ranks and for the society as a 
whole. The drafters did not copy the 1971 constitution but they did emulate the 
way in which it inserted a provision on religious education with Article 58, which 
stated: “All educational institutions, be they public, private, communal, or a 
combination thereof, commit themselves to the state’s educational plan and its 
goals. All this happens to enhance the linkage between education and the needs 
of both society and production. Religious education as well as national history 
form essential subjects at all levels preceding the university.” The constitution 
also provided that “the universities commit themselves to teaching the norms 
and ethical foundations at the heart of their various scientific specializations.” 
The tone of these provisions was potentially more intrusive, extending as they 
did explicitly to “all educational institutions” and saddling universities with the 
task of teaching unspecified but perhaps religious “ethical foundations.” 
That document governed Egypt only for six months before the military 
engineered a systematically reworked document that maintained the elision 
between moral development and education, the requirement for religious 
education, and the strong state role in shaping public primary and secondary but 
also private and university education. It provides that:  
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Every citizen has the right to education. The goals of education are to 
build the Egyptian character, preserve the national identity, root the 
scientific method of thinking, develop talents and promote innovation, 
establish cultural and spiritual values, and found the concepts of 
citizenship, tolerance and non-discrimination. The State shall observe the 
goals of education in the educational curricula and methods, and provide 
education in accordance with international quality standards…. 
The State shall supervise education to ensure that all public and private 
schools and institutes abide by its educational policies…. 
Arabic Language, Religious Education and National History, in all its 
stages, are core subjects in public and private pre-university education. 
Universities shall teach human rights and professional values and ethics 
of the various academic disciplines.  
The provisions for consulting al-Azhar were dropped. 
What is remarkable is not the failure of the constitutional text to change—it did 
change. Instead what is striking is how vague the clauses were, how unconnected 
they remained from any implementing procedures or mechanisms, and how little 
constitutional jurisprudence centered on interpreting or applying their meaning.  
The most significant constitutional dispute concerning religion and education, 
for instance, involved none of the clauses to address the issue but instead the 
minister of education’s edict prohibiting school girls wearing the full face veil. 
There were tremendous contests over state, religion, and education to be sure—
but the true battles occurred in schools, campuses, unions, ministries, and 
mosques and not over text. And change came slowly in part because of the 
intensity of the struggles. The constitutional text was not often cited in the 
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growing public debates in Egyptian newspapers and various broadcast media 
except the very general article 2 (proclaiming the principles of the Islamic shari`a 
the “main source of legislation”)—and that provision was cited more for its 
symbolic nod of obeisance to Islamic law than for its legal meaning. The texts 
seemed to be a place to proclaim principles but those principles showed 
remarkable consistency, in part because they were so vague. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
In new states, the mark of a truly constitutional moment is whether the new 
constitution creates and consolidates (“constitutes”) a new regime. When it 
comes to the case of religious education, we have shown that the new regimes in 
Norway, Ireland and Egypt reproduced many of the features of the regimes they 
replaced; their constitutions in this respect at least amounting to little more than 
an endorsement of existing arrangements, even where - in Ireland and Egypt – 
the colonial power which established these relationships was of a different 
religion. These cases also have in common the degree to which the teaching of 
religion in the national curriculum has endured long after the relevant 
constitutional texts were written. Moreover, such changes in those arrangements 
which were later made have not been fought on a constitutional turf: the 
amendments seem to be byproducts of developments in the social and political 
realm rather than their drivers.  
 
Why has this been the case? Why have what seem old-fashioned clauses been so 
immune to change, especially at a time when the demands placed on educational 
systems have grown so much? Clearly these states did not possess a secular 
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understanding of their respective nations when they became independent. The 
original clauses reflected very deeply embedded assumptions about the locally 
dominant religious tradition, and an unspoken consensus on the value of 
religious education existed which lasted long beyond the adoption of the first 
national constitutions. Since both the major religious institutions and state 
leaderships shared the view that religious education was an indispensable 
means of passing on ethical and social values, and since such values would 
promote an identification with the state, it was natural that they should co-
operate in this sphere.  
 
Yet the historical dominance of these religions does not explain why, as 
economic and demographic changes brought in their train a more secular and 
more pluralist culture, the constitutional privileging of religious education has 
continued. The second reason is that while the constitutional provisions had 
reflected the interests of powerful social and political actors, their relative 
brevity – indeed vagueness - has allowed both the state authorities and the 
religious authorities a great deal of flexibility when it comes to the provision of 
religious education. Hence formal amendments have not been necessary for 
those wanting secular change. In Ireland and Norway, the brief clauses admitted 
a host of social and institutional changes and because of their capaciousness 
remained oddly insulated from them. Egypt is slightly different, because the 
constitutional text did change far more, but in a manner that indicated that it was 
an afterthought, and that circumstance distanced it from any attempts to change 
institutional arrangements on the ground. In short, changes to the formal texts 
have generally been minimal, and when changes to educational policies have 
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occurred, these have not been primarily the product of major constitutional 
change. In Egypt and Ireland, the drivers are typically socio-economic; in Norway 
changes have come with secularization. 
 
The result in all three is an increasing “disconnect” between the constitutional 
provisions for education and the actual situation on the ground. (Fox 2011). 
Ireland, where the relevant clauses reflect Catholic social teaching in the 1930s 
but most school leavers go on to study at a secular third level system, is a good 
example. Most Catholic schools have no religious personnel and lay 
teachers teach “religion” (not the Catholic Religion) as an examinable subject for 
the Junior Cert. in secondary schools.6 The constitution aside, religious education 
has changed. Grace’s conclusion that in the 1980s and 1990s the British 
state imposed a strong “framing regime” on all schools, regardless of their 
religious character, also applies to Ireland. This disconnect between the 
constitutional clauses and such increasingly technocratic framing regimes may 
provide an opportunity for secularists to launch a frontal attack on the 
constitutional provisions. Yet, contrary to the expectations and 
recommendations of separationist theory, the mutual accommodation between 
religion and state has continued. Here we encounter a third factor: clauses on 
religious education that have their origins deep in the past are now largely in 
conformity with international human rights laws on parental choice, minority 
rights and religious freedom.   For example, article 26 section three of the 1948 
UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights declared ‘Parents have a prior right to 
                                                        
6
 Grace (2002: 46) argues that in England the pedagogy, even in Catholic schools, has become 
dominated by output measures of specific competences and skills, standardized tests, and 
measures of how the objectives of a National Curriculum have been delivered. 
 33 
choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children’ and this 
stipulation has always been claimed to cover parental choice in favour of 
educating their children in accordance with the religious commitments and 
beliefs of the home. Other international instruments and conventions have 
further expanded on this demand.With the notable exception of socially radical 
and some conservative Islamist regimes like Iran and Saudi Arabia patterns of 
religious establishment have been progressively reformed so as to protect these 
rights; accommodationism has become the most common frame of state-religion 
constitutional relations as separationism has waned.7  
 
The combination in all three cases – modernizing change within older 
accommodative constitutional traditions - fits the theoretical framework put 
forward by Mahoney and Thelen (2010: 292), who argued that contrary to 
models which expect us to find big changes during historical breaks, we discover 
significant continuities through “unsettled” historical times, and ongoing 
contestation and negotiation in “settled” periods that nonetheless add up to 
significant change. No doubt this is because the accommodative practices are 
very old.  ‘Path dependence’ - a concept often used to explain institutional 
persistence - requires the scholar to adopt a “branch like” perspective to legal 
outcomes, and raises the question of whether there have been significant 
deviations from the initial choices that were made in the nineteenth century. In 
Norway there have been changes: but they took two centuries to occur. The 
                                                        
7 For Cole Durham and others the US should now be reckoned accommodationist despite the 




Irish educational system was not based around any document: its 
denominational cast was the product of the political divisions of the 1830s, and 
the unwillingness of the Catholic Church and its members to become co-opted 
into the British state. This system remains in place. In Egypt more change has 
been attempted: yet despite the relatively instability of constitutional life, the 
constitutional protection of religious education has been no less enduring.   
 
In her discussion of the persistence of personal status regulations after 
independence in Israel and India, Lerner (2014) shows that an institutional path 
was created during the formative stages of independence, but that personal 
status regulations survived largely because of unintended decisions and “the 
absent minded missing of historical opportunities by the founders” (410). In 
contrast, Künkler and Sezgin (this special issue) show a general trend in many 
African and Asian states towards increasing reliance on forms of legal pluralism 
and multiple jurisdictions. While Lerner stressed missed opportunities, Künkler 
and Sezgin show that even when the founders had “monist” ambitions, “the 
limits of monism” became apparent over time. Our cases show both the absence 
of genuine critical junctures, and how hard it is for the state to “get on top” in 
education. While Norway and Ireland are examples of missed opportunities, 
Egypt conforms to what Künkler and Sezgin see as a general limit of monism. 
Since in each case the path dependence in this area of state-religion relations 
spans two or three centuries, the role of deliberate design, and the ability of 
actors to get beyond past structures should not be exaggerated. (ibid, 14). Yet 
rather than explaining the persistence of religious education - or its 
constitutional protection – in terms of political will or lack of state capacity the 
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role of accommodative practices which now span three centuries has to be 
stressed. 
 
It is worth considering the absence of critical junctures and the relative 
immunity of the constitutional provisions to the effects of social and economic 
change in the context of the modern state’s alleged role in producing cultural 
homogenization. Conversi (2007) argues that the process began in early 
modern Europe, and stresses the role of armies in imposing measures: discipline, 
citizenship rituals, and language learning, we now associate with schooling. He 
defines homogenization as “a subtractive process” involving the negation of the 
existence of separate groups, languages, traditions and ideas within one polity 
(2007, 388). The language is very similar to Charles Taylor’s (2007) depiction of 
the mainstream view of secularization as “subtraction stories” involving the 
losing, sloughing off, or removing of religion from public life. Had the modern 
state such a need for homogenization,  and were the subtraction of distinct 
cultures required, one would expect it to apply especially to religious education.  
Yet in none of these cases has religion been subtracted from the curriculum.  
None adopted, at the time of state formation, the aggressive secularism that 
emerged in France and Turkey.  Moreover, religious education has not been 
subtracted from the formal texts either.  
 
 Indeed, not only did the state gain no initial monopoly over education in general,  
the rights of minority groups in this sphere have also persisted, even where (in 
Egypt and Ireland) they were enjoyed by groups that were more privileged than 
the rest of the society. The outcome is paradoxical: while  these cases have in 
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common large degrees of “ethnic” as well as religious homogeneity - the laws and 
institutional practices have a pluralist logic that reflect those of more ‘divided’ 
societies. These laws and practices reflect the experiences of political societies 
that were already old and well-established, when sovereign statehood was 
achieved. The constitutions which were adopted around the time of 
independence therefore made use of, and reflected, already deeply-embedded 
practices of blending religion and education, and were less acts of invention than 
of redirection and assertion. The logic since then of combining modernization 
with scant constitutional change is a very powerful one for the institutional 
leaderships of the religious communities—so powerful that they have sought to 
protect it and various other forces have avoided the temptation to re-open long 
settled issues. Those who want change have not needed to re-open the text since 
the true locus of change lay elsewhere. Constitutional texts do have meaning, of 
course, but the general constitutional formulas, strongly worded though they 
may be, that support a strong role for religion in education cannot resist longer-
term social forces that change precise arrangements or gradually alter their 
effect and meaning. The comparison here has suggested that those wanting 
change recognize the constitutional limitations in this field more than in perhaps 
any other, but have in any case found alternative avenues for achieving it. 
In terms of the theme of this special issue – how the legal boundaries between 
states and religions are drawn within formal constitutions – the drafters of the 
constitutions of these states recognized their limitations especially in the field of 
education. And the theoretical value of focusing on such cases has been that they 
illustrate the fact that these limitations conform to constitutional logics that are 
hard to explain if the theoretical lens used is the principle of separation, or the 
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over-simple use of “Church” and “State” as legal and institutional antinomies. 
This conclusion lends further support to the arguments of Ferrari, Monsma and 
Soper, and others, that, in fact, in this field if not more widely accommodationism 
is the overwhelmingly common pattern and that the American and French 
prohibitions on religious education in public schools represent exceptions rather 
than the norm (Cole Durham 1996,Monsma and Soper 1997, Ferrari 2008). The 
true exceptionalism in this field is the prohibition of religious education in public 
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